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ABSTRACT
Ethical implications of music education as a helping profession
As professionals, music teachers are faced with a range of ethical responsibilities
that are tied to the particular benefits that the music education profession, by its
very existence, promises to contribute to graduates’ musical abilities and future
musical options. However, the ethical dimensions of music education are too often
overlooked, both in the preparation of new teachers and in evaluating the practices
of in-service teachers.
This study provides a philosophical review of key aspects of normative ethics that
merit being acknowledged and addressed if music education is to be most fully
ethical and music teachers most productively professional. To clarify this ethical
responsibility, duty, consequentialist, and virtue ethics are briefly surveyed and
common grounds between them are noted in order to recommend a range of criteria
for an applied professional ethics of music education. Certain teaching practices
from school music and individual lessons are offered as evidence that ethical
failings are often involved in many common music teaching practices and that an
applied ethics can help music teachers to be most fully professional and effec-
tive.
Keywords: professional teaching ethics, normative ethics, applied ethics, music
education.
Introduction
According to functionalist sociology, a society creates particular social structures to
accomplish basic functions it needs to survive. Thus, the helping professions, such as
medicine, law, therapy, and the ministry, have evolved to promote human wellbeing
and, thus, society. Teaching, similarly conceived, is not simply a specialized occupation;
it is a helping profession. With such professional standing, however, comes the ethical
responsibility of serving those for whom the profession exists: students and society. As
professionals, then, the ethical responsibilities of music teachers are tied to their implied
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promise to contribute in functional ways to students’ musical abilities and dispositions
and, through these, to the life well-lived.
However, this ethical responsibility is too often overlooked in training or evaluating
teachers. On the assumption that music is good, the corresponding assumption is taken
for granted that simply providing musical “experiences” in schools and studios is auto-
matically aesthetically good, and that such musical “activities” are therefore routinely
beneficial and educative. This leads to an “anything goes” ethics of radical relativism
where just about any teaching is regarded as “good enough.”
This study briefly summarizes the three leading normative ethical theories and
related meta-ethical issues that warrant being acknowledged and addressed if teaching
music is to be most fully ethical and music teachers most fully professional.
Normative and applied ethics
To begin with, normative ethics propose criteria for ethical conduct. However, such
normative criteria are often compromised by the often unique particulars and messy
details of actual cases. The principle of proportionalism thus allows ‘bending’ norms
when important situated variables take precedence; for example, lying to save a life.
In contrast, applied ethics—also called situation or practical ethics (Singer
1997)—begin with typical cases and needs, and reason from them to relevant ethical
criteria. Applied ethics guide the various professions; for example, legal and medical
ethics. However, applied ethics draw from normative theories (and other sources) and
tend to establish norms of ‘due care’ for their respective fields.
Most helping professions therefore formally educate new members about the profes-
sion’s ethical standards. This has not been typical in teacher education, however. Most
ethical criteria for teachers are matters of statutory law (e.g., laws against physical
punishment), amount to platitudes (e.g., be considerate to all students), or are common
sense (e.g., do not get romantically involved with students). Typically missing is the
central ethical criterion that arises from the function for which the teaching profession
exists. To be effective and ethical, then, music teaching should fulfill its responsibility
to provide the clearly functional musical benefits its very existence promises to students
and society. Failure to produce such benefits results in an escalating legitimation crisis
that requires ever-more political ‘advocacy’ to justify the continued status, even exis-
tence, of music education—particularly of “school music.”
To clarify this ethical responsibility, the normative theories of duty, consequen-
tialist, and virtue ethics will be surveyed with a view to identifying a range of potential




Duty theories (also called deontological, from the Greek deon for duty) state obliga-
tions that follow from their stipulated criteria, such as the Ten Commandments, the
Golden Rule, or Immanuel Kant’s various “categorical imperatives.” Duty theories also
follow criteria that flow from the concept of rights—as regards the teaching profession,
students’ rights.
One problem with duty theories is that a duty is categorical—an absolute
ought—and thus an action that fulfills a duty can be regarded as ethical regardless of its
consequences; for example, a teacher’s ethical duty can be regarded as fulfilled simply
by offering instruction, even if results are negative or inconsequential. However, certain
ethical criteria from duty ethics can fruitfully apply to music education, chief among
them being the prevailing duty to provide the functional musical benefits the profession
exists to serve.
Duty ethics and music education
First and foremost, is the duty that professional actions should benefit students in func-
tional ways, not the teacher, and not music programs as though ends-in-themselves.
Instruction—whether in school classes and ensembles or individual lessons—should
not, therefore, be a pre-existing mold into which students are force-fit, or that limits
their musical options. ‘One-size-fits-all’ didactics assume that all students are alike in
background, ability, and interests, and share common needs. They also assume that
teaching situations (demographic contexts, resources, schedules, national curriculums,
etc.) are interchangeable and respond equally or in the same ways to technicist teaching.
Ensembles and instrumental instruction are often predicated mainly (or even solely) on
either “good music” as decreed by academe, or “school music” that similarly attempts
to advance “good taste.”
Too often, however, both school and non-school based ensemble programs become
autonomous, and students end up serving the program rather than the program serving
their musical needs and interests. And individual lessons often submit students to
uniform methods and materials that ignore individual differences and interests, or
that assume all students are being prepared to seek careers as professional musi-
cians. However, serving the educational functions of life-long learning and life-long
“musicking” (Small 1998) depends on teaching that prepares students for far more than
the next concert, recital, or lesson. Without such carry-over to life outside of and after
graduation from school, music teachers risk failing in their duty to provide the function
for which music education exists: the functional advancement of a student’s musical
abilities and options. The ethical criterion, then, is: What can the student do—at all,
better, more often, or with greater reward—as a result of instruction?
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A second general duty is the ethical injunction to “do no harm.” This is violated
when students are physically harmed. For example, some pedagogies and didactics
violate the biomechanics of young and still developing bodies and can produce medical
conditions. Similarly, the harmful effects of rehearsing or practicing in acoustically
unsuitable spaces are increasingly being recognized and researched. And, of course,
students who have learned only to dislike their required music classes, or who have not
had their musical (and other) needs and interests met, in effect have been ‘harmed’ by
not benefiting functionally from instruction in ways that are meaningful and lasting.
Third, the right of students to be safe includes being safe from psychological harass-
ment or exploitation. Violators include music teachers who resort to embarrassment
and intimidating tactics that can have serious, even long-term, negative psychological
consequences for students. Teachers who strategically employ insensitive challenge or
audition systems rely on a dubious educational and ethical principle because, in such
situations, a student reaches his or her goal only at the expense of all other students not
meeting theirs.
The duty to be fair and just is a fourth right due to students. Fair and just treatment
is denied when music teachers serve only an elite or self-selected few; or where students
sense that certain students are the ‘teacher’s pet’ (which often causes social problems
for them with peers). Excluding students by competition and audition, or because the
program or pedagogy offers little that interests them musically fails to meet their musical
and other needs. Ignoring those who lose interest or quit rather than redoubling teaching
efforts to meet their needs, also falls short of the functionalist duty to serve all students’
musical needs fairly.
A fifth traditional duty is to benefit the needy. This duty relies on the premise that
music education is a calling that exists to altruistically benefit the musical needs of
students. In this, a “need” is understood in terms of the skills and understanding required
to be musically active in pragmatic ways, and it also includes expanding musical choices
beyond those students enter school with; for example, as learned from family, church,
ethic group, community, or nation. Thus, their individual needs and interests must be
diagnosed and then met, instead of being dictated—as is the case when students are
treated as though they all have the same needs, or to meet the ‘standard’ needs of the
school program or ensemble.
Furthermore, such altruism implies results that are unequivocally beneficial.
Teaching that produces no discernible benefits is ethically unaccountable and thus
unwarranted because its virtue cannot be determined. Similarly, teaching that produces
no lasting benefits as far as students’ musical choices and musicking as adults can also
be doubted as to its functional contributions and, thus, as to its ethical status. Students
whose musical abilities and options have not been advanced in notable ways—a kind
of ‘value added’ ethical and curricular criterion—have not been ethically or musically
served well; such students and society in general have not been benefitted by the func-
tional professional ethic expected of a helping profession.
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The sixth duty follows from a basic conception of human rights: allowing and
promoting free expression. However, this duty is often difficult to meet with large
ensembles and can be met more readily, for example, with a well-planned offering of
solos, duets, trios, and so on. And instead of dictating all musical decisions, ensemble
directors and studio teachers should promote the independent musicianship that facili-
tates the learner’s own decision-making ability in the service of life-long musicking.
Last among traditional ethical duties to be discussed here is one of Kant’s lesser
known categorical imperatives: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity . . .
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (trans. Vardy & Grosch
1999: 58; italics added). Since students are the ends for which music education exists
as a helping profession, the duty follows that it is their musical benefits and satisfac-
tions that ought to be benefitted. If music or the teacher’s needs are the ends for which
music education exists, then students’ musical needs are sacrificed and teaching fails to
meet its ethical obligations to them. Despite their self-congratulatory ‘high standards’,
teachers who teach as though protecting music from students answer the age-old ques-
tion of whether we teach students or music by favoring the latter, rather than achieving
a balance that serves each side of the equation.
However, a teacher may also benefit (musically and otherwise) and still be ethical as
long as students also clearly benefit as much as or more than the teacher. This provision
is further clarified by consequentialist ethics.
Consequentialist ethics
Instead of focusing on duties, consequentialism focuses on observable and pragmatic
results. It promotes an applied ethics based on concrete criteria of professional account-
ability based on the function(s) for which the helping profession exists.
Contemporary consequentialism stems from the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill. This philosophy introduced the concept of “utility” to ethical
theory: for an action to be ethical, consequences should be useful for those affected by
it. Thus, to be fully ethical on this account, the ‘good’ supposedly served by teaching
must clearly be useful for students, not just supposedly good for them on some vague
or noble-sounding grounds. Results also need to be truly consequential: they should
contribute to a significant need and to a functional degree of usefulness.
Furthermore, an ethical action is one that produces “the greatest good for the greatest
number,” as the saying goes. Moreover, an action is “good” that, overall, is more produc-
tive of happiness or pleasure or more avoiding of unhappiness or pain than its alterna-
tives. However, for consequentialism “pleasure” is understood in terms of wellbeing or
thriving rather than hedonistically, while “pain” refers to undesirable results, such as
boredom or aversion.
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Consequentialism and music education
For consequentialism, then, music education is most ethical when it pragmatically
advances students’ present and future musical wellbeing. School music and individual
lessons thus carryover functionally to life and contribute to society.
First, instead of focusing on duties deemed to be ethical regardless of results,
consequentialism analyzes the possibility of both positive and negative consequences;
then it judges whether the potential positives outweigh the negative risks. In schools,
however, the differing musical needs of the greatest number of students usually cannot
be addressed by large ensembles. And instrumental and voice teachers whose skill-drill
demands result in students losing interest and ‘dropping out’ (actually or mentally) have
failed to consider the negative consequences of their teaching. Again, protecting music
from students is not an ethically warranted consequence. Technique, taught as though
for its own sake, goes for naught when students quit lessons for lack of musical interest:
they wanted to study music, not scales and exercises. And this includes literature require-
ments that fail to in any way or degree take students’ own musical choices and interests
into consideration. Students practice sports drills because they see the direct relevance
of the skills gained to the pleasures derived from improved performance. Music students
resist skills drilled in isolation from real music-making when they cannot similarly
connect practiced skills to enhanced rewards of performance.
Secondly, unlike the ethical criteria duty ethics stipulate in advance, for consequen-
tialism the ethical merit and value of teaching choices and actions are seen only after the
fact, in terms of their pragmatic musical usefulness for students. Thus, all teaching deci-
sions are treated as hypotheses that need to be tested in action for their utility. If a hypoth-
esis concerning methods, materials, curriculum (etc.) fails to provide effective (which
is to say, pragmatically useful) results, then alternative or remedial actions need to be
taken based on alternate hypotheses. This amounts to a kind of informal and on-going
action research and to so-called “reflective practice.” Students who practice too little
or who fail to progress are symptoms of a failure to address this ethical criterion. Just
assigning practice is not enough: students need to learn how to practice efficiently and
effectively and, thus, be rewarded from their efforts by musically satisfying progress.
Third, consequentialism is keenly aware that some teaching actions—no matter
how dutiful or constructive the intentions—may have negative consequences. Ethical
responsibility thus requires special efforts on behalf of students who fall behind or in
any way lose interest. Blaming parents for not enforcing practice or the seductions of
TV, computer games (etc.) is an ethical ‘cop-out’! On the assumption that everyone is
attracted to music and is rewarded by it, means are sought by which negative results
are overcome by rewarding results. This can involve wholesale changes in the literature
chosen and a reconsideration of basic pedagogical premises.
Fourth, the pragmatic focus of consequentialism is on the needs of particular
students. Unlike duty ethics, then, no ‘one-size-fits-all’ teaching practice can be ethical.
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Diagnosis of students’ always unique circumstances and changing needs is required.
Thus, just as “good health” is not the same thing for an 8-year-old as for an 80-year-old,
‘musical good health’ varies according to a host of individual variables. Music teachers
who are like a doctor who wants only healthy patients proceed on very weak ethical
grounds. And it precisely the challenge of meeting such variable needs that is the source
of the personal and professional rewards of teaching.
Finally, consequentialism is keenly alert to observable differences between the
anticipated benefits and the actual consequences promoted for the musical thriving
of students and graduates. Results that are neither readily apparent nor unmistakably
beneficial to students’ musical wellbeing suggest the failure to fulfill the functional
contribution music education exists to promote and thus the failure to meet the ethical
responsibility of the profession. For example, simply assuming that students are auto-
matically benefitted “aesthetically” from any and all musical “activities” and “experi-
ences,” despite no advancing of their present skills and while retaining their existing
tastes, choices, and interests into adulthood, risks the ethical failure of ‘making no differ-
ence’ and, thus, of failing to provide the functional benefits for which the profession
exists.
Virtue ethics provide further criteria for applied ethics.
Virtue ethics
Instead of focusing on obligations (as duty ethics do) or anticipating beneficial results
(as does consequentialism), virtue ethics focus on personal traits of the agent—in
particular, on a disposition for practical judgment based on a reasoned prior judgment
of the ‘good’ to be served by a teaching action.
Virtue ethics first gained prominence in the writings of Aristotle who distin-
guished between ethical and intellectual virtue. For Aristotle, “virtue” did not have the
moralistic sense that it has today, particularly in connection with religion and good
‘morals’. “Virtue,” instead, was regarded as the excellence that fulfilled the ‘good’ for
which an action was undertaken. Ethical virtue (excellence) involves twelve character
traits that Aristotle regarded as inborn or a result of upbringing, such as patience and
courage. However, intellectual virtue (excellence) includes three “primary” kinds of
acquired knowledge and skill: theoria, techne, and praxis. Actually, Aristotle cited five
“primary” intellectual virtues (Aristotle 1998: 140-147): the three forms of acquired
knowledge, plus intelligence (nous) and wisdom (sophia). Intelligence supports any
cognitive endeavor, and wisdom is the holistic result of character, learning, and experi-
ence.
Theoria involves speculative reason and its active form is contemplation. However,
unlike his teacher Plato, Aristotle stipulated that ethical actions depend on practical
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reason, not theoretical speculation. Thus he wrote: “the virtue [excellence] of a thing [or
action] is relative to its proper work” (Aristotle 1998: 138). Accordingly, the “proper
work”—the functional or pragmatic end(s)-in-view for always unique practical situa-
tions and needs—provide the criteria for empirically judging the virtue of an action, thus
avoiding “anything goes” relativism.
Techne involves the creating of practical ‘things’. It relies on technical and cogni-
tive skills that can be passed on, practiced, and applied routinely to usually uncontro-
versial ends. Its active ethical form is poe¯isis, or “excellent making.” Because ‘things’—
including performances, productions, events, etc.—not people are at stake, mistakes
typically carry no ethical responsibility. However, when teaching is approached as
techne—that is, as a craft-like collection of routinized, technical strategies and ‘how
to’ teaching ‘tools’ employed as ‘what works’ recipes for achieving taken for granted
ends—then then it deteriorates into a process that treats students as though they are
interchangeable ‘things’ on a factory assembly line.
In contrast to techne, then, praxis is a ‘doing’ or action that serves the always unique
(and often changing) needs of individuals. Accordingly, praxis is centrally concerned
with the ethical criterion of promoting ‘good’ or ‘right results’, as judged in terms of their
discernible functional contributions to the present and future wellbeing of students.
Praxis thus involves knowledge that promotes ‘right’ or ‘virtuous [excellent]
action’, and it depends on the active virtue of phrone¯sis: the ethical need to be caring,
wise, and far-sighted in bringing about ‘right [excellent] results’ and prudent in doing
no harm. Malpraxis is the failure to achieve ‘right results’ or the failure to avoid harm.
It is important to stress that malpractice in the helping professions is not a failure to
observe standardized practices or methods; in the helping professions, practices are
properly tailored to the non-standard needs of different individuals (even to different
needs at different times in a person’s life). Malpractice, instead, is the lack of having
observed ethical standards of ‘due care’ and, thus, having created harmful or negative
results. The practical wisdom on which teaching as praxis depends therefore requires
an ethic of caring that is focused on the needs of students (as much as, or more than on
musical values) and of being prudent in decisions that affect their personal and musical
wellbeing. In comparison to the other helping professions, however, the lack of a recog-
nized ethic of malpraxis in teaching is a serious and on-going ethical weakness.
In practice, the virtue ethic of caring relies on Aristotle’s four so-called “secondary”
intellectual virtues: first, acquiring knowledge needed for effective decision-making;
second, skills for diagnosing what is ‘right’ and just; third, the understanding needed for
analyzing relevant variables; and, finally, the resourcefulness and versatility that effec-
tively takes into account differences between individuals and situations. Such praxial
knowledge has many sources, including study, research, and reflective praxis (e.g.,
action research).
Importantly, in Aristotle’s virtue ethics practical wisdom is always subordinate
to philosophical virtue! He writes that philosophy “makes us aim at the right mark,
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and practical wisdom makes us take the right means” (Aristotle 1998: 155). “Good
teaching,” then, is not a matter of first deciding on supposedly ‘good methods’ and
materials; rather, it is a matter of first using reason to envision philosophically warranted
‘right [excellent] ends’, then carefully choosing the ‘right [excellent] means’ and prag-
matically evaluating the virtue and value of teaching according to how well the prag-
matic end(s)-in-view were realized.
As viewed by virtue ethics, then, teaching music is inescapably an ethical and,
therefore, a praxial endeavor, not techne or a craft-like collection of ‘one-size-fits-all’,
‘what works’, ‘best practices’, methods, materials, techniques, or strategies. It is a
professional and thus ethical ‘doing’ that exists and is continually ‘practiced’ to help
students become more musically and humanly functional. Those results are the ends-
in-view that determine ethical action and qualify effective practices. Ultimately, then,
“good teaching”—where “good” qualifies both the ethical dimension and the ‘good for’
served—draws from accumulated practical wisdom—praxial knowledge—that teachers
build from a history of promoting ‘right [excellent] results’.
Virtue ethics and school music
Virtue ethics reinforces key principles from both duty and consequentialist ethics, yet
makes its own contribution to applied ethics.
First, as with consequentialist ethics, the concern of virtue ethics with ‘right results’
focuses on individual students. Accordingly, the ‘rightness’ or ‘goodness’ of results is
properly judged in terms of meeting students’ individual needs. In music, the very exis-
tence of a world of different (and sometimes competing) musics testifies to different
musical and social ‘goods’ that are served by those musics; not only different ‘goods’
served by music (e.g., music that is “good for” religion, ceremony, dancing, socializing,
etc.) but the various musics that serve such “goods” differently, according to individuals
and societies. When only a very narrow range of such musics are offered (for a given
student, or for all students), the likelihood is great that individual musical and social
‘goods’ are being ignored and, thus, the ‘helping’ status of teaching actions falls profes-
sionally short of being fully ethical.
Next, and again in common with consequentialism, caring enough to be care-full
[sic] entails vigilantly diagnosing students’ needs and providing for them via reflective
practice. However, virtue ethics stresses the additional responsibility that music teachers
should remain up-to-date and should develop the versatility needed to meet students’
always differing and ever-changing needs. As society, students, and music changes, so
must music teachers change and adapt. In today’s world of rapid technological change,
music “apps” for smart phones, tablets, and computers have become major sources of
musical interest and modes of musicking. These media are ignored at the risk, first of
all, of the increasing irrelevance of music education and its worsening legitimation crisis
(i.e., need for ‘advocacy’); and, second of all, of failing to keep pace with the modes
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that musicking can take for many students and citizens and, thus, of failing to meet their
needs. For example, thanks to the available (and ever-growing apps), everyone who
owns a smart phone already owns a musical instrument capable of serving a wide-range
of musicking (Walker 2011), and ignoring this potential risks a serious ethical failing.
Music teachers need not give up teaching the traditional music media; but given the
availability of music apps (that range from performance, to composition, to “musicky”
games; see Gouzouasis and Bakan 2011), music teachers need to keep up with the music
world that extends well beyond traditional media and options.
Third, virtue ethics go beyond the good intentions and normative criteria of duty
ethics. They insist that the teacher promote ‘right [excellent] results’, not just go through
the motions of dutifully providing lessons that—no matter how much fun students may
seem to have—lead to no discernible or long-term musical growth.
Next, such ‘right results’ need to make a significant and lasting practical difference
in much the same sense understood by consequentialism. Failure to make such a differ-
ence—failure to have added consequential musical value to students’ lives—means that
the claimed benefits have not been promoted for students in ways that ethically justify
the time, effort, and expense involved to students, their parents, and society. Again, such
failure also lacks virtue because it leaves students’ musical needs unmet.
Despite the continuing, common sense acceptance of functionalist criteria for
schools and teaching, however, newer sociological theories of education go beyond the
premises of the social transmission of ‘accepted culture’. According to social transfor-
mation models, for example, music educators should transform and empower students
musically and thus help transform students and society—not just transmit “our musical
heritage” and reproduce status quo criteria of ‘good taste’ and the like. And rather
than transmitting ‘accepted culture’, interpretive theories of schooling are concerned
with constructing culture in terms of individually and socially constituted contemporary
meanings and values. These newer theories cannot be explored here, but music education
is ethically responsible for responding to such changing conceptions of education and,
as mentioned above, for preparing students for the rapidly changing world of music that
already exists in society outside of school or the school years.
Fifth, Aristotle taught that virtue was qualified by what he calls the “precision”
proper to a particular endeavor. He counsels that we must
not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision
as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For
a carpenter and geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; . . . We must
act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, . . .” (Aristotle 1998: 14).
In other words, different ends-in-view and needs have different ethical criteria. The
“precision” involved in training professional musicians—the artistry, musicianship,
technical excellence, musical standards, literature, etc.—is, then, neither the function
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served by school music and amateur ensembles, nor the goal of those students who do
not aspire to professional careers. The different aims and needs of most students requires
a different kind of “precision,” a different kind of ethical and musical excellence; for
example, those focused on serving students’ eventual musical needs as, for the most part,
adult amateurs, and those useful to empowering graduates to take fullest advantage of
the multiple forms of musical praxis in a society.
Finally, virtue exists only in contrast with its absence! Thus, if all teaching is “good
enough,” it lacks virtue. Improved ethical and practical judgment benefits from experi-
ence, but the most useful learning experiences come from improving upon faulty judg-
ments. Failure to acknowledge such weaknesses leaves music teachers free to employ the
same collection of supposedly “good lessons” (or endless variations on them) without
regard for the excellence (virtue) of results. Such a lack of professional accountability
also ignores the ethical problems of malpraxis.
Conclusions: An applied ethics of music education
My conclusions point to an applied ethic of regarding music teaching as a professional
praxis. The three normative ethical theories summarized here overlap to a fruitful
degree. However, virtue theory, with its concept of teaching as professional praxis and,
thus, with its corresponding ethic of care, is the most comprehensive for overlapping
the most relevant contributions of duty and consequentialist ethics. Approached as a
professional praxis, teaching music becomes at every step an ethical matter: the teacher
thus focuses on ethical grounds and criteria for teaching choices and actions, not just
on musical criteria. Decisions concerning what to teach and why, how to teach it, and
whether (or the degree to which) teaching and learning have been successful all turn
on the kinds of meta-ethical questions and principles sampled earlier. Each teaching
decision, no matter how representative of a ‘type’ of situation, is its own “case,” and it
requires the virtue of case-based analysis that considers situated particulars in terms of
relevant ethical criteria.
Such an applied ethics of music education means that a teacher’s ethical responsi-
bility is not fulfilled simply by dutifully going through the motions of offering instruction
using traditional or standardized methods and materials, or simply of providing musical
“experiences” and “activities.” An applied ethic of music education will be mindful of
the intersecting criteria of duty, consequential, and virtue ethics. In particular, the ethic
of care that regards teaching as a matter of ethical professional praxis will help promote
the kinds of ‘right results’ for students and society that fulfill the function that the music
education exists to provide as a helping profession. Mindfulness of the ethical dimensions
of music education is thus an important part of the specialized knowledge teachers need if
they are to most fully meet the ethical commitments of teaching as a helping profession.
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